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Abstract
The subject of this speech is how to improve enforcement of Europe’s ban on abuse of
monopoly power. This ban is laid down in Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (“EC Treaty”), our equivalent of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States.
Such enforcement is a crucially important element in ensuring an effective competition policy,
which is in turn a key factor in increasing Europe’s competitiveness.
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Neelie Kroes*
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and honor for
me to address this long-established international antitrust forum
that has always taken such a welcome and keen interest in the
development and application of European competition policy.
The subject of my speech today is to how to improve en-
forcement of Europe's ban on abuse of monopoly power. This
ban is laid down in Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Community ("EC Treaty"),1 our equivalent of Section 2
of the Sherman Act in the United States.2 Such enforcement is a
crucially important element in ensuring an effective competition
policy, which is in turn a key factor in increasing Europe's com-
petitiveness.
I. ARTICLE 82
Article 82 deals with unilateral conduct by an enterprise
with market power, which restricts competition on the market.'
I am convinced that the exercise of market power must be as-
sessed essentially on the basis of its effect in the market, al-
though there are exceptions such as the per se illegality of hori-
zontal price fixing.4 This is consistent with the way we apply Eu-
rope's rules on collusive behavior, laid down in Article 81 of the
* European Commissioner for Competition. This speech was originally delivered
at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's Thirty-Third Annual Conference in Interna-
tional Antitrust Law and Policy, Sept. 14-15, 2005.
1. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
82, O.J. C 325/33, at 65 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
3. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 82, O.J. C 325/33, at 65 (2002).
4. See id. at 64-65.
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EC Treaty, as well as other instruments of European competition
law.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to emphasize that it is
not our intention to propose a radical shift in enforcement pol-
icy. We simply want to develop and explain theories of harm on
the basis of a sound economic assessment for the most frequent
types of abusive behavior to make it easier to understand our
policy, not only as stated in policy papers, but also in individual
decisions based on Article 82.
Article 82 enforcement should focus on real competition
problems: In other words, behavior that has actual or likely re-
strictive effects on the market, which harms consumers. There
are two main reasons for this: Firstly, enforcement agencies
should be cautious about intervening in the functioning of mar-
kets unless there is clear evidence that they are not functioning
well. As you say in the United States, "if it ain't broke, don't fix
it!" Secondly, enforcement agencies do not have unlimited re-
sources and need to focus their efforts on what makes a real dif-
ference.
As I am sure you all know, I am an economist by training.
Now I am an antitrust enforcer by profession! As an economist,
I want an economically sound framework. But as an enforcer, I
need a workable and operational tool for making enforcement
decisions.
It is not the aim of the current review to end enforcement
of Article 82. Any conclusions we reach on the right economic
approach to adopt must take into account the need to ensure
that the rules can be enforced effectively.
II. DOMINANCE
Article 82 only applies to companies in a dominant market
position, and naturally I identify dominance with substantial
market power.
In order to conclude that a company has substantial market
power, one must conduct a detailed analysis of key issues, such as
the market position of the allegedly dominant company, the
market position of competitors, barriers to expansion and entry,
and the market position of buyers. This means that I consider
that high market shares are not, on their own, sufficient to con-
clude that a dominant position exists. Market share presump-
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tions can result in an excessive focus on establishing the exact
market shares of the various market participants. A pure market
share focus risks failing to take proper account of the degree to
which competitors can constrain the behavior of the allegedly
dominant company. That is not to say that market shares have
no significance. They may provide an indication of domi-
nance-and sometimes a very strong indication-but in the end
a full economic analysis of the overall situation is necessary.
III. THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE
In our view, the objective of Article 82 is the protection of
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer
welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.
We also think that it is sound for our enforcement policy to
give priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, since exclusion is
often at the basis of later exploitation of customers. I will there-
fore focus on exclusionary abuses and will not deal with what we
call exploitative abuses, such as, for instance, excessive pricing;
nor will I deal with discriminatory abuses. This being said, I am
well aware that some abuses may have effects, which both ex-
clude and exploit or discriminate. I will deal with exploitative
abuses in a second round of our policy review.
Some may think it is somewhat surprising that after many
years of enforcement against abusive conduct there is still a lively
debate on the objectives of Article 82.' Indeed, there is a similar
debate about Section 2 of the Sherman Act here in the United
States.6
I am aware that it is often suggested that-unlike Section 2
of the Sherman Act-Article 82 is intrinsically concerned with
"fairness" and therefore not focused primarily on consumer wel-
fare.7 As far as I am concerned, I think that competition policy
5. See COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 3.02 (Valentine Korah
ed., 2005) (noting that the precise role of Article 82, and its relationship with other
objectives of the European Union and the policy underlying it, have not yet been set-
tied definitively).
6. See A CENTURY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: AMERICAN ECONOMIC OPINION, 1890-1990
(Jack C. High & Wayne E. Gable eds., 1992) (collecting articles documenting the shift-
ing objectives of Sherman Act); see also Rudolph J. R. Peritz, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAw (rev. ed. 2000) (recounting history and evolution of
Sherman Act).
7. Compare Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767
(1984) (stating that aggressive competition, though perhaps unfair to less efficient busi-
2006]
596 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:593
evolves as our understanding of economics evolves. In days gone
by, "fairness" played a prominent role in Section 2 enforcement
in a way that is no longer the case.8 I don't see why a similar
development could no take place in Europe.
My own philosophy on this is fairly simple. First, it is com-
petition, and not competitors, that is to be protected. Second,
ultimately the aim is to avoid consumer harm.
I like aggressive competition-including by dominant com-
panies-and I don't care if it may hurt competitors, as long as it
ultimately benefits consumers. That is because the main and ul-
timate objective of Article 82 is to protect consumers, 9 and this
does, of course, require the protection of an undistorted com-
petitive process on the market.
We need to take into account not only short-term harm, but
also medium and long-term harm arising from the exclusion of
competitors. I am well aware of the difficulty associated with
predicting medium or long-term harm. But I believe that we
should focus not only on, for instance, the short-term price ef-
fects of a certain form of conduct, but also take into account the
medium to long-term effects should residual competitors be
foreclosed. Consumer prices may fall in the short-run but end
up being higher in the medium to long-term because of the
likely foreclosure effects. We cannot just wash our hands of re-
sponsibility and say that competition law cannot or should not
protect the consumer against negative medium to long-term ef-
fects, just because it is difficult to assess.
The judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Hoff-
nesses, "is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that
the Sherman Act aims to foster"), with British Airways PLC v. Commission, Case T-219/
99, [2003] E.C.R. 11-5917, _, 242, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 19, 1050-51 ("[W]hilst the find-
ing that a dominant position exists does not in itself imply any reproach to the under-
taking concerned, [the dominant undertaking] has a special responsibility, irrespective
of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted
competition on the common market.").
8. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 981, 981-84
(1986).
9. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2005] E.C.R..... 150,
[2005] 4 C.M.L.R. 5, 450 (stating that "the purpose of [EC Treaty Article 82] is to
safeguard the interests of consumers, rather than to protect the position of particular
competitors") (internal quotations omitted).
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mann-La Roche case ° is a good starting point to define abuses
that exclude. The Court emphasized that the behavior under
review has to have a certain effect on the market." Second, the
Court values the protection of equal opportunities for residual
competition, so that remaining competitors are able to improve
in efficiency and thereby increase competition to the dominant
company." This means two things: Firstly-the conduct of the
dominant firm must have the potential to influence the position
of residual competition on the market and therefore be likely to
negatively impact prices, quantities or innovation in the market.
In other words what we call "foreclosure." Secondly-a market
distorting foreclosure effect must be established and not simply
the foreclosure of one or two competitors. This may depend on
factors such as the market coverage of the conduct or, for exam-
ple, the selective nature of the conduct if it targets strategic cus-
tomers that may be important for new entrants or residual com-
petitors. These factors must be analyzed to check whether there
is a credible "theory of foreclosure" that fits the facts of the case.
IV. PRICE BASED ABUSES
A famous phrase in the Hoffman-La Roche judgment is
"through recourse to methods different from those which condi-
tion normal competition.""3 This is, of course, connected to the
well-known issue of what constitutes "competition on the mer-
its," and is a particularly controversial subject with respect to
price-based abuses-especially rebates. I would like to spend a
moment on how one could think about this.
Exclusionary abuses may be both price based and non-price
based: Examples of non-price based abuses, where it is clear that
some 'exclusion' takes place, are contractual tying, "naked" re-
fusals to supply, and single-branding obligations (which you in
the United States call exclusive dealing). 4 The question is
whether such exclusion may be characterized as anticompetitive,
10. See Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R.
461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
11. See id. at 467, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 219-20.
12. See id. at 578-80, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 239-41.
13. Id. at 540, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 232.
14. Commission Notice, 0.J. C 291/1, at 21 (2000) (Guidelines on Vertical Re-
straints).
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in other words, impacting not only competitors, but also compe-
tition in the market.
Similar exclusionary effects may be achieved through pric-
ing. For instance: very high stand-alone prices in comparison to
a low bundled price for two products may "tie" these two prod-
ucts together as effectively as contractual tying; asking a very
high price for a product or combining a high upstream price
with a low downstream price may amount to a "constructive" re-
fusal to supply; high rebates given on condition of single brand-
ing may have the same effect as contractual non-compete obliga-
tions; last but not least, predatory pricing is, of course, meant to
exclude competitors.
However, low prices and rebates are normally to be wel-
comed, as they are beneficial to consumers. So how do we de-
cide what should properly be regarded as "competition on the
merits" when it comes to price based conduct?
Certain forms of pricing conduct may have different exclu-
sionary effects depending on how efficient the rivals are. It is
clear to me that inefficient competitors should not be protected
by competition policy from aggressive price-based actions of a
dominant firm. In my view, "competition on the merits" takes
place when an efficient competitor that does not have the bene-
fit of a dominant position, is able to compete against the pricing
conduct of the dominant company.
One possible approach to pricing abuses could be based on
the premise that only the exclusion of "equally efficient" compet-
itors is abusive. The benchmark for "as efficient" would nor-
mally be the costs of the dominant company, except where it is
not possible to determine such costs, or when the dominant
company-for instance in a newly liberalized market-has some
"first-mover advantages" that later entrants cannot be expected
to match.
V. EFFICIENCIES
Another widely debated issue is whether it is desirable and
indeed possible for there to be an "efficiency defense" under Ar-
ticle 82.
Article 82 does not expressly foresee the possibility of "ex-
empting" abusive behavior because of efficiencies. However, we
must find a way to include efficiencies in our analysis. We must
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take into account that the same type of conduct can have effi-
ciency-enhancing as well as foreclosure effects. This should be
reflected in our analytical framework.
I have to admit it is difficult to explain why we consider effi-
ciencies under Article 81 and under the Merger Regulation, but
not under Article 82. At the most basic level, the same conduct
can be analyzed under both Article 81 and Article 82. It would
be rather strange if we concluded that a particular form of con-
duct is not anti-competitive under Article 81, but infringes Arti-
cle 82, with the only explanation for that divergence being that
we cannot work out how to take the pro-competitive aspects into
account under Article 82.
For reasons of consistency, the analytical framework for re-
viewing efficiencies under Article 82 should not differ much
from those used under Article 81 and the Merger Regulation. In
particular, I consider that it is for the dominant company to
demonstrate that the following conditions are fulfilled: Firstly,
the claimed efficiencies should be realized or be likely to be real-
ized as a result of the conduct concerned. Secondly, the efficien-
cies should be "conduct specific"-the unilateral conduct should
be indispensable to realize these efficiencies. Thirdly, the effi-
ciencies should outweigh the negative effects of the conduct
concerned. This means that we balance the pro- and anti-com-
petitive effect of the conduct and ensure that, in the final analy-
sis, consumers are not harmed by the conduct. Under Article
81(3) there must be a pass on to consumers. 5 I think that this
should also be the case under Article 82.
Last-but in the Article 82 context certainly not the least-
the well-known condition for applying Article 81(3), that compe-
tition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned
not to be eliminated, 6 must also be respected when applying
Article 82. Therefore, there is a level of market power where
efficiencies can no longer prevail over the long-term interest of
protecting competition in the market.
Let us not, however, forget that there are numerous types of
abusive conduct where there are no efficiencies at all. One re-
15. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81(3), O.J. C 325/33, at 65 (2002) (requiring
that exempted agreements must give consumers "a fair share of the resulting benefit").
16. Id.
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cent example in Europe is the AstraZeneca case. 7 The methods
applied by AstraZeneca to misuse the patent system in that case
were certainly not motivated by efficiency considerations.18
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What I have summarized today is our search for sensible
"rules" that would enable us to reach preliminary conclusions
about when conduct may exclude competition, yet at the same
time allow companies to know when they are on safe ground.
Such an approach would have the advantage of being based on
solid economic thinking while at the same time giving clear indi-
cations to companies and maintaining workable enforcement
rules. This is of course only a first step. We intend to go on and
review other categories of abuse.
I sincerely hope you will all participate in the wide discus-
sion that we want to have on this review, with industry as well as
legal and economic experts-and, of course, the other antitrust
authorities including here in the United States. Thank you for
your attention.
17. AstraZeneca v. Commission, Case T-321/05 (CFI June 15, 2005) (not yet re-
ported).
18. See Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission Fines As-
traZeneca C60 Million for Misusing Patent System to Delay Market Entry of Competing
Generic Drugs (June 15, 2005).
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